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Abstract 
Previous studies suggest that feelings of regret are elicited by events appraised as goal 
incongruent and caused by the self and that they are characterized by a tendency to repair the 
event. Study 1 investigated whether the appraisal of self-agency increases the tendency to repair. 
Participants played a game in which goal-congruent and goal-incongruent events were caused by 
themselves (self-agency) or by a die (circumstances-agency). The tendency to repair was 
measured via behavior and self-reports. Self-agency increased feelings of regret but not the 
tendency to repair. Moreover, our data rejected the idea that regret is more than other negative 
feelings associated with the tendency to repair. Study 2 confirmed the findings of Study 1 using 
autobiographical recall. Both studies provide support for a relation between self-agency and 
feelings of regret, but not between self-agency and the tendency to repair nor between the 
tendency to repair and feelings of regret. 
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 Exploring the Relations Between Regret, Self-agency, and the Tendency to Repair Using 
Experimental Methods and Structural Equation Modeling. 
Imagine that you are a finalist in a television quiz and one crucial decision keeps you 
from winning a million dollars. The concept is simple: one choice, everything or nothing. The 
show host presents you with two identical boxes, one containing the money, the other containing 
nothing. After some hesitation, you choose one of the boxes. The host opens the box you did not 
choose and you see that it contains the money. You realize that you chose the wrong box. 
In situations like this, people are typically haunted by counterfactual thoughts on how 
things could have been if they had chosen differently. Mental time travel, vivid simulations of 
alternative actions, and other reverie are considered to be characteristic for the emotion of regret 
(Landman, 1993). Researchers have argued that besides these cognitive characteristics, regret has 
particular motivational qualities: Regret is said to be associated with the desire to undo the 
adverse outcomes of one’s decisions, with reparative action tendencies, and with goal persistence 
(Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004a, 2006, 2007; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 
1998, 2000). In this paper, we investigated the relations between causing a negative outcome 
oneself, wanting to repair that outcome, and feelings of regret. We examined whether negative 
outcomes that are caused by oneself are associated with a stronger tendency to repair the 
outcome than negative outcomes that are not caused by oneself. In addition, our studies shed a 
new light on the relation between regret and the tendency to repair. 
In contemporary emotion theories, emotions are often defined as multicomponential 
phenomena, consisting of (a) a cognitive component or appraisal of the situation, (b) a 
motivational component or action tendency, (c) a somatic component or (neuro)physiological 
responses, (d) a motor component or expressive behavior, and (e) a feeling component or 
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subjective experience (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Moors, 2009; Roseman, 2001; 
Scherer, 2005). The feeling component is considered a reflection of the other components 
(appraisal, action tendencies, physiology, and/or behavior) in consciousness (de Rivera, 1977; 
Scherer, 2005; Sonnemans & Frijda, 1994). Particular feelings (i.e., patterns in the continuous 
flow of componential changes that surface in awareness) are labeled with emotion words such as 
regret, anger, fear, disappointment, and joy (Moors, 2009; Scherer, 2009). 
Previous studies have investigated the appraisal process that shapes the feeling called 
regret. Appraisal is a process in which stimuli are evaluated on a number of appraisal variables, 
such as goal relevance, goal congruence, expectancy, coping potential, future expectancy, agency 
(i.e., the cause of an event: self, other, circumstances), and fairness (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; 
Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Scherer, 1988). These studies typically reveal that regret, 
together with guilt and shame, is part of a class of feelings that reflect that a stimulus is appraised 
as goal incongruent and caused by the self (Shefrin & Statman, 1985; Zeelenberg et al., 2000). 
Other negative feelings reflect that a stimulus is appraised as goal incongruent and caused by 
others (e.g., anger) or by circumstances (e.g., fear, sadness, and disappointment; Roseman et al., 
1996; van Dijk, van der Pligt, & Zeelenberg, 1999; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; Zeelenberg, 
van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, van der Pligt et al., 1998). The appraisal of 
agency thus seems crucial to differentiate regret from other negative feelings. Other appraisals 
differentiate regret from guilt and shame. Research has suggested that shame is felt when a 
person appraises herself as bad or as having failed to live up to personal standards (Keltner & 
Buswell, 1996; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Tracy & Robins, 2006) whereas guilt 
is felt when a person appraises that she has caused harm to another person (Keltner & Buswell, 
1996; Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2008). 
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Researchers have argued that the feeling of regret also reflects the activation of a specific 
action tendency: the tendency to repair the goal-incongruent event. For instance, Zeelenberg, van 
Dijk, Manstead, and van der Pligt (1998, p. 224) wrote “we conclude that the experience of  
regret  involves  a  focus  on  the  self  as  a  cause  of  the  event,  and  on possibilities for 
undoing  the regret by changing the unfavourable outcome or by improving future performance.” 
Other negative feelings reflect the activation of other action tendencies, such as the tendency to 
attack for anger, to obtain safety for fear, to disappear from sight for shame, and to become 
passive and turn away from the goal-incongruent event for disappointment (Frijda, 1986; 
Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead et al., 1998). 
Repairing a goal-incongruent event can take different forms. Some authors suggest that regret is 
related to one particular type of repair tendency: The tendency to redo but correct the initial 
behavior that gave rise to the goal-incongruent event (Roseman, 2011). Other authors do not 
seem to impose such restrictions (e.g., Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead et al., 1998). For 
instance, when burning your birthday cake in the oven, you can repair this by making a new cake 
but setting the alarm clock (i.e., redo but correct) or by a wider range of actions such as buying a 
cake in the bakery or making another dessert. In the first, more restricted proposal, the appraisal 
of self-agency is logically implied in the definition of the action tendency: In order to redo but 
correct a behavior, the initial behavior must have been performed by oneself. In the second 
proposal, the concepts of appraisal and action tendency can be separated, which allows 
investigating the influence of one on the other. 
In sum, previous research suggests that an appraisal of self-agency and  a tendency to 
repair discriminate the feeling of regret from various other negative feelings. These studies 
focused either on the relation between regret and appraisals or on the relation between regret and 
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action tendencies, neglecting the relation among appraisals and action tendencies. The aim of the 
present research is to examine the relation between the appraisal of self-agency and the tendency 
to repair. 
We start by listing three possible ways in which the appraisal of self-agency and the 
tendency to repair can be related. A first possibility is that there is a causal relation. Several 
appraisal theorists (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Scherer, 1994) suggest that appraisals cause action 
tendencies. Thus, it has been argued that an appraisal pattern of goal-incongruence plus self-
agency may cause the tendency to repair. For instance, van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2002, p. 329) 
propose that the motivational differences between regret and disappointment may be produced 
by differences in the appraisals of agency and/or legitimacy (for a similar position, see Martinez, 
Zeelenberg, & Rijsman, 2011, p. 963). In principle, however, it is also possible that the tendency 
to repair causes the appraisal of self-agency or that they exert a mutual causal influence on each 
other (Moors & Scherer, 2013; Scherer, 2009). 
A second possibility is that there is not a causal relation between the appraisal of self-
agency and the tendency to repair but only a temporal co-occurrence (Parkinson, 1997). A reason 
for such a co-occurrence may be that the appraisal of self-agency co-occurs with another 
appraisal and that this other appraisal causes the tendency to repair. For instance, goal-
incongruent events caused by oneself typically may be more easy to cope with than goal-
incongruent events caused by others or by circumstances. In turn, high coping potential may lead 
to the tendency to repair the event. 
A third possibility is that there is not an actual but only a semantic relation between the 
appraisal of self-agency and the tendency to repair (Parkinson, 1997). For instance, layman’s 
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theories about regret may assume a link between self-agency and the tendency to repair 
(culturally inherited or acquired otherwise) that does not reflect reality. 
In a first study, we examined whether the appraisal of self-agency has a causal influence 
on the tendency to repair. Previous research has examined the influence of this appraisal on a 
variety of behaviors that could be interpreted as manifestations of the tendency to repair. A first 
set of studies have shown that an appraisal of self-agency encourages a person to seek 
information about an obtained outcome and possible alternatives (Reb & Connolly, 2009; Shani 
& Zeelenberg, 2007). Information seeking can serve the goal to repair a goal-incongruent 
outcome or the goal to prevent a repetition of goal-incongruent outcomes in the future. A second 
set of studies show that self-agency leads to behavioral persistence or the escalation of 
commitment in investments (Staw, 1976) and in gambling (Clark, Crooks, Clarke, Aitken, & 
Dunn, 2012; Clark, Lawrence, Astley-Jones, & Gray, 2009). Behavioral persistence can be 
considered a manifestation of the tendency to repair if it is guided by the idea that it can undo a 
loss. A third set of studies suggest that the appraisal of self-agency (or self-blame) increases 
prosocial behavior toward an unrelated third party (Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967; 
Ketelaar & Au, 2003; D. T. Regan, Williams, & Sparling, 1972, but see Cialdini, Darby, & 
Vincent, 1973; Rawlings, 1968, and J. W. Regan, 1971, for failed replications, and Cunningham, 
Steinberg, & Grev, 1980, for boundary conditions). Helping a third party can be seen as an 
expression of the tendency to repair one’s image rather than the goal-incongruent situation. 
There are also studies that measured the tendency to reconcile with or help the person that one 
has hurt, instead of helping an unrelated third party. Some of these studies found a significant 
influence of self-agency on the tendency to repair (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; de Hooge, 
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Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2011; Freedman et al., 1967; Parkinson & Illingworth, 
2009), but others did not (Konecni, 1972; Struthers, Eaton, Shirvani, Georghiou, & Edell, 2008). 
The majority of the cited studies manipulated self-agency in a social context (i.e., 
participants caused a goal-incongruent situation for another person) because they focused on 
feelings of guilt, which are thought to reflect the appraisal that one has caused interpersonal harm 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Keltner & Buswell, 1996). Regret and guilt are 
believed to partly overlap. Both are assumed to be characterized by the tendency to repair 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995; Haidt, 2003; Roseman et al., 1994), but feelings of 
regret can arise in a broader range of situations than feelings of guilt, including non-social ones 
(Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2008). The mixed results concerning the relation between self-
agency and the tendency to repair could be due to the complex social contexts that were used to 
study guilt. For instance, Konecni (1972) compared a group of participants who caused someone 
to drop a folder with cards (self-agency) with a group that saw someone else cause it (other-
agency) and observed that the first group felt embarrassed and therefore quickly disappeared 
from sight. In a social context, feelings of shame and fear (e.g., for angry reactions from others) 
and the tendency to avoid may be stronger than the tendency to repair. If so, the relation between 
self-agency and the tendency to repair may be more robust outside a social context. On the other 
hand, it could also be that the social context is necessary for obtaining this relation. The few 
studies that examined the role of self-agency outside a social context unfortunately measured 
behaviors that may stem from other motivations than the tendency to repair. For instance, 
information seeking may stem from the tendency to reduce uncertainty rather than the tendency 
to repair (Shani & Zeelenberg, 2007). 
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In Study 1, we examined the influence of the appraisal of self-agency on the tendency to 
repair in a non-social context, using dependent measures that were designed specifically to pick 
up the tendency to repair. In a multiple-trial game, participants encountered goal-congruent and 
goal-incongruent outcomes caused by themselves (self-agency) vs. caused by a die 
(circumstances-agency). We expected that the manipulation of agency would not be confounded 
with other appraisals, such as goal congruence or (un)fairness, because a die is a fair medium. 
The tendency to repair was measured via actual repair behavior after each encounter with a goal-
incongruent outcome and via self-reports at the end of the experiment. A schematic overview of 
the hypotheses is shown in Figure 1. Following appraisal theories, our first hypothesis (H1) was 
that there would be a causal relation between the appraisal of self-agency and the tendency to 
repair: Goal-incongruent outcomes caused by the self elicit a stronger tendency to repair than 
goal-incongruent outcomes caused by circumstances. 
In addition to the causal relation between the appraisal of self-agency and the tendency to 
repair, Study 1 also aimed to investigate (a) the relation between the appraisal of self-agency and 
the feeling of regret and (b) the relation between the tendency to repair and the feeling of regret. 
Previous studies using scenario (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998) and recall methods 
(Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead et al., 1998) have provided support for these relations. 
However, both methods have met with serious criticisms (Parrott & Hertel, 1999). Therefore, we 
tried to replicate these findings in a carefully controlled experiment in which the appraisal of 
agency was manipulated with actual events and participants’ feelings of regret, disappointment, 
and anger were collected. In line with previous studies (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; 
Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998), our second hypothesis was that goal-incongruent 
events caused by oneself would elicit more regret than goal-incongruent events caused by 
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circumstances (H2a) but not more disappointment and anger (H2b). Moreover, also in line with 
previous studies (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead et al., 1998) our third hypothesis was that the 
tendency to repair would be associated with feelings of regret (H3a) but not with other negative 
feelings such as disappointment and anger (H3b). Study 1 produced several findings that 
diverged from the literature. These were further examined in Study 2. 
Study 1 
Participants played a choice game on the computer in which they tried to win points. 
High scores were rewarded with lottery tickets. The game consisted of a series of trials on which 
the participant steered  an avatar  in the upper or lower road of a fork (see Figure 2). There was a 
piece of food at the end of each road. On self-agency trials the participant could choose a road; 
on circumstance-agency trials the experimenter rolled a die that determined which road the 
participant had to take. The participant then moved the avatar in the upper or lower road toward 
the piece of food. When the avatar reached the food, both pieces of food turned into points: one 
piece turned into ten points, the other into zero points. Goal-congruent trials were those on which 
the avatar had taken the road with ten points. Goal-incongruent trials were those on which the 
avatar had taken the road with zero points. On each goal-incongruent trial a fix button appeared. 
The participant could try to repair the goal-incongruent outcome by moving the avatar toward 
this button and pressing it a number of times. On half of the goal-incongruent trials, pressing the 
fix button resulted in regaining the ten points; on the other half, it did not. The participant had to 
decide on each goal-incongruent trial whether to repair (by moving toward the fix button) and 
how long to keep trying to repair (how many times to press the fix button). The number of repair 
responses was  used as a measure for the tendency to repair. At the end of the experiment we also 
assessed the self-reported tendency to repair on self-agency trials and on circumstances-agency 
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trials. The repair behavior in our study was not costly nor limited to a number of predetermined 
responses. This was done to encourage participants to respond according to their intuition rather 
than according to some strategy that might be based on other factors than agency (e.g., available 
resources). 
Method 
Participants.  
A total of 26 students (Mage = 21; 12 women) at Ghent University participated in the 
study, nineteen in return for course credits and seven in return for payment (8 €)1.  
Apparatus.  
The experiment was programmed in C++ and run in Visual Studio 6.0. It was displayed 
on a 19” CRT screen. The game map consisted of a two-dimensional maze with turquoise walls 
and grey paths, forming six horizontally positioned forks and a connection between them, that 
was blocked by a brown wall. The six forks were arranged in three layers of two forks (see 
Figure 2). If the avatar had reached the end of the sixth fork, it was automatically transported 
back to the first fork. Participants used the arrow keys on the keyboard to move the avatar 
through the maze. Participants won a lottery ticket (a scratch-and-win card) during the game. 
Each card yielded 25% chance of winning a money prize between one and ten thousand euro. 
Procedure.  
All participants were tested individually in a session of one hour. The experimenter was 
seated next to the participant except when the participant filled in the questionnaire. Before the 
start of the experiment, each participant signed an informed consent form. The experiment was a 
choice game consisting of 160 trials (i.e., 160 times crossing a fork). A trial started when the 
avatar reached the brown wall that blocked the next fork. The brown wall then disappeared and 
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two food items appeared, one in the upper and one in the lower road of the fork. The participant 
then moved the avatar toward the start of the fork, at which time the word “ik”, which is Dutch 
for “me” (on self-agency trials, 80 trials) or a picture of a die (on circumstances-agency trials, 80 
trials) appeared in front of the avatar (see Figure 3). On self-agency trials, the participant chose a 
road by saying “boven” (which is Dutch for “up”) or “onder” (which is Dutch for “down”). 
He/she then pressed ENTER to remove the word “ik” and steered the avatar in the road of his/her 
choice. On circumstances-agency trials, the experimenter rolled a real die with the labels B and 
O and named the outcome of the die (if B then “boven”; if O then “onder”). The participant 
pressed ENTER to remove the picture of the die and then steered the avatar in the road indicated 
by the die. As soon as the avatar entered one of the roads, the roads were closed off by a brown 
wall to prevent the avatar from going back. Our cover story provided  participants with explicit 
instructions on how to choose a road/food during the game: 
The computer determines via a very complex algorithm
2
 which number of points is 
behind which food. This algorithm is too difficult to discover, but research has shown 
that if people follow their intuition they perform better than according to chance level. 
We would like to test this hypothesis. This is why we ask you to make choices according 
to your intuition. Try to ask yourself each time the following question: “Which choice 
feels best?” 
When the avatar reached the food in the upper or lower road, both food items were 
replaced with a number. On goal-congruent trials (60% of the trials), the food next to the avatar 
was replaced with ten and the other with zero (see Figure 3), a positive sound was played, and 
the participant’s score was increased by ten points. After the points were shown, the game froze 
for 500 ms and a new trial began. On goal-incongruent trials (40% of the trials), the food item 
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next to the avatar was replaced with zero and the other item with ten, a negative sound was 
played, and the score remained unchanged. The game then froze for 500 ms before a sideway 
with a fix button appeared (see Figure 3). The participant could either move the avatar toward 
the fix button and try to repair the goal-incongruent outcome or move the avatar toward the 
brown wall that blocked the next fork to start a new trial. The computer determined at random 
which trials were goal congruent and which trials were goal incongruent. 
On half of the goal-incongruent trials, the ten points could be regained after pressing the 
fix button ten to thirty times. The exact number of required button presses was determined at 
random on each trial and was unknown to the participants (participants also did not know it 
would be a number between ten and thirty). If the participant pressed the fix button a number of 
times equal to the random number on that trial, the ten and zero points switched places, the fix 
button disappeared, a positive sound was played, and the participant’s score was increased by ten 
points. After that, a new trial began. On the other half of the negative trials, the ten points could 
not be regained. The participant had to decide how long to keep pressing the fix button before 
starting the next trial (by moving the avatar toward the brown wall that blocked the next fork). 
The number of button presses on these trials was used as an index for the tendency to repair. 
All instructions were given orally and were followed by two demonstration trials and five 
practice trials. The demonstration trials consisted of one goal-congruent self-agency trial and one 
goal-incongruent circumstances-agency trial. On the goal-incongruent trial, the experimenter 
demonstrated how to repair the goal-incongruent outcome (the ten points were regained after 15 
button presses). The practice trials consisted of one goal-congruent and two goal-incongruent 
circumstances-agency trials (one repairable after 15 button presses) and two goal-incongruent 
self-agency trials (one repairable after 15 button presses). We informed participants that on half 
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of the trials repairing would not work, irrespective of how many times they pressed the fix 
button. Again, we asked participants to use their intuition when deciding about the number of 
times to press the button. There was no time limitation for the repair responses nor a speeded 
response instruction. Participants were informed that the game would end after their avatar had 
completed 160 forks. 
Participants were told they would win a lottery ticket after finishing a maze combined 
with a score equal to or higher than 450 points, 900 points, and 1350 points. In general, 
participants had to complete about ten mazes to reach a score of 450 points and twenty mazes to 
reach a score of 900 points. In these cases, a message appeared that the 450 or 900 threshold was 
reached and a lottery ticket was won. After the last trial, the total number of points was displayed 
(which was always below the threshold of 1350 points), together with a message that the third 
lottery ticket was not won. 
At the end of the experiment, a questionnaire was administered in which we measured 
appraisals, action tendencies, and feelings separately for self-agency and circumstances-agency 
trials. For each trial type, we presented four scenes and asked participants to rate items on seven-
point scales specified below. Scene 1 depicted the avatar at the start of a fork, when the word 
“ik” or a die appeared, and participants rated appraisals of expectancy and self-agency. For 
expectancy, they estimated the chance of winning ten points immediately (when the food turned 
into points) and eventually (at the end of the trial) on a scale ranging from 1 (very low) to 7 (very 
high). For self-agency, they rated the extent to which they felt they could influence the number 
of points they would win immediately and eventually on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(yes completely).  
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Scene 2 depicted a zero point outcome and participants rated appraisals of goal 
congruence or valence (1 = very negative, 7 = very positive), fairness (1 = very unfair, 7 = very 
fair), future expectancy (the likelihood of winning back the ten points after moving into the 
sideway, 1 = very low, 7 = very high), and coping potential (the extent to which the participant 
estimated he/she could influence the winning back of ten points; 1 = not at all, 7 = yes 
completely). We also measured feelings of regret, disappointment, and anger, as well as the 
tendency to repair (on scales ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = yes completely). For the tendency 
to repair, participants indicated (a) the extent to which they were inclined to take the sideway and 
try to regain the ten points and (b) the extent to which they were inclined to keep trying if 
repairing did not immediately lead to success.  
Results 
The behavioral and the self-report data were analyzed via paired samples t-tests, Pearson 
correlation coefficients, and Steiger Z-tests. Before discussing the results for H1 to H3, we tested 
whether the agency manipulation was successful and whether it affected only agency or also 
other appraisal variables. 
Manipulation check. 
As can be seen in Table 1, self-agency trials scored significantly higher than 
circumstances-agency trials on the appraisal of self-agency. As expected, participants indicated 
they had more influence on the number of points they won on self-agency than on 
circumstances-agency trials. There were no differences between the self- and circumstances-
agency trials for  the appraisals of valence, fairness, future expectancy, coping potential and 
expectancy of winning ten points immediately (i.e., when the food turned into points), but there 
was a difference for the expectancy of winning ten points eventually (i.e., at the end of the trial). 
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More specifically, participants had  higher expectancies to win the ten points eventually on self- 
than on circumstances-agency trials. 
The influence of the appraisal of agency on the tendency to repair. 
To investigate whether self-agency trials elicited a stronger tendency to repair than 
circumstances-agency trials (H1), we inspected repair behavior (on-line) and the self-reported 
tendency to repair (at the end of the experiment). We first removed all trials on which repairing 
was possible
3
 (leaving 16 self-agency and 16 circumstances-agency trials in the analysis) and all 
trials on which the number of repair responses deviated more than 2.5 SDs from the means on 
self-agency and circumstances-agency trials (1.56% of the trials)
4
. Subsequently, we calculated 
the average number of repair responses on self- and circumstances-agency trials. Dependent-
samples t-tests showed that participants did not repair more on self- than on circumstances-
agency trials (see Table 1). Additional analyses were conducted to investigate whether the 
absence of an effect could be due to a strategy of participants to press the repair button a fixed 
number of times on most (or all) of the trials. The within-subject range of the number of repair 
responses (M = 43.50; SD = 26.43) as well as the within-subject standard deviation of the 
number of repair responses (M = 10.93, SD = 6.93) suggested there was trial-to-trial variation in 
the number of repair responses participants emitted. This within-subjects standard deviation was 
significantly higher on the trials of interest (in which repairing was not possible) than on the 
remaining trials (in which repairing was possible and the repair button disappeared after 10 to 30 
button presses), M = 6.26, SD = 1.93), t(25) = 4.07, p < .001. Thus, the variance in repair 
behavior even exceeded the variance in the number of responses required to repair goal-
incongruent outcomes on the repair-possible trials. 
17 
 
Confirming the data obtained with the behavioral measure, agency did not significantly 
influence the self-reported tendency to repair. Neither of the items that measured the tendency to 
repair revealed significant differences for self-agency and circumstances-agency trials (not 
confirming H1; see Table 1). 
The relation between the appraisal of self-agency and feelings of regret, 
disappointment, and anger. 
As predicted, self-agency trials gave rise to stronger feelings of regret than 
circumstances-agency trials (confirming H2a) and anger did not differ significantly between self-
agency trials and circumstances-agency trials (partly confirming H2b). Contrary to the 
predictions, however, self-agency trials also elicited stronger feelings of disappointment than 
circumstances-agency trials (disconfirming H2b, see Table 1). 
The relation between the tendency to repair and feelings of regret, disappointment, 
and anger. 
We tested the hypotheses that the tendency to repair is correlated with feelings of regret 
(H3a) but not with feelings of disappointment or anger (H3b). Table 2 presents correlations that 
were calculated separately for self-agency trials, circumstances-agency trials, the difference 
scores between self-agency and circumstances-agency trials, and the averages across self-agency 
and circumstances-agency trials. A correlation between the difference scores means that the 
influence of agency on feelings is correlated with the influence of agency on the tendency to 
repair. Although there was no main effect of agency on the tendency to repair in previous 
analyses, it could be that there is interindividual variation in the effect of agency on the tendency 
to repair that is related to variation in the effect of agency on feelings. Again, we used both a 
behavioral measure and a self-report measure for the tendency to repair. Before calculating 
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correlations between the self-reported tendency to repair and feelings, we summated the two 
items used to measure the tendency to repair into one scale.  
The correlations are presented in Table 2. Contrary to the predictions, none of the 
correlations between regret and the tendency to repair were significant (neither for the self-
reports nor for the behavioral measures; not confirming H3a). On the other hand, all correlations 
between disappointment and the tendency to repair were significant (or marginally so) and a 
number of correlations between anger and the tendency to repair were significant (disconfirming 
H3b). Steiger Z-scores were calculated to investigate whether the correlations between the 
tendency to repair and disappointment and the tendency to repair and anger were significantly 
higher than the correlations between the tendency to repair and regret. As can be seen in Table 2, 
a subset of the correlations for disappointment differed significantly from the correlations for 
regret. The correlations between disappointment and the tendency to repair on self-agency trials 
were higher than the correlations between regret and the tendency to repair on these trials: 
behavioral measure
5
, z = 2.12, p = .034, self-report measure, z = 1.170, p = .090. Similarly, the 
correlations between the difference in disappointment on self- and circumstances-agency trials 
and the difference in the tendency to repair on self- and circumstances-agency trials was higher 
than the same correlations for regret: behavioral measure, z = 1.93, p = .053, self-report measure, 
z = 2.20, p = .028. Finally, the correlations for disappointment across trials and the tendency to 
repair across trials were marginally higher for disappointment than for regret for the behavioral 
measure, z = 1.94, p = .053 (but not for the self-report measure, z = 1.14, p = .25). The 
correlations between disappointment and the tendency to repair on circumstances-agency trials 
were not significantly different from the correlations between regret and the tendency to repair 
on these trials, zs < 1.31, p > .19 (see Table 2). Contrary to the pattern for disappointment, none 
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of the correlations for anger were significantly different from those for regret, all zs < 1.51, ps > 
.13. 
Discussion 
Study 1 did not provide support for a causal influence of the appraisal of self-agency on 
the tendency to repair (not confirming H1). Both the self-report and the behavioral measures 
suggested that participants were equally motivated to repair goal-incongruent outcomes caused 
by themselves as those caused by circumstances. One could argue that this finding is not a 
genuine null finding, but rests on methodological shortcomings of Study 1. For instance, the 
reward value of the repair responses may have been too high, causing the tendency to repair to be 
at ceiling, leaving little room for agency to influence the tendency to repair. This explanation is 
unlikely, however, given the within-subject variation in the amount of repair responses and the 
significant correlations between the difference in repair behavior on self- vs. circumstances-
agency trials and the difference in feelings of disappointment on self- vs. circumstances-agency 
trials. These correlations suggest that our operationalization of agency was capable of producing 
meaningful within-subject differences in the tendency to repair. Our results thus provide a first 
indication that other variables (such as the intensity of disappointment) may be a better predictor 
of the tendency to repair than the appraisals of self- and/or circumstances-agency. 
In addition, our study contradicted several findings of previous research. First, we found 
that goal-incongruent events elicited both stronger feelings of regret and stronger feelings of 
disappointment when they were caused by oneself than when they were caused by circumstances 
(confirming H2a, disconfirming H2b).  Zeelenberg, van Dijk, and Manstead (1998) manipulated 
agency via scenarios and showed that goal-incongruent events caused by oneself elicited more 
regret but less disappointment than goal-incongruent events caused by circumstances. Second, 
20 
 
we found that the tendency to repair was related to the intensity of disappointment but not to the 
intensity of regret (disconfirming H3a and H3b). A study by Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, 
and van der Pligt  (1998) showed the exact opposite pattern. In sum, Study 1 provided support 
for one of the five hypotheses (H2a) only. 
Study 2 
A first aim of Study 2 was to further investigate the relation between self-agency and the 
tendency to repair. Study 1 did not provide support for the idea that the appraisal of self-agency 
increases the tendency to repair. However, self-agency and the tendency to repair may be related 
in other ways. We explored the possibility that the appraisal of self-agency and the tendency to 
repair may be related in an indirect way, via the appraisal of coping potential. This idea builds on 
a functional view of emotions and action tendencies (Camille et al., 2004; Lazarus, 1991; 
Roseman et al., 1996; Wortman & Brehm, 1975) which proposes that action tendencies are 
responses to the environment that can be understood from their benefits to the organism. 
According to this view, the tendency to repair will be activated when it is possible and functional 
to repair, thus when coping potential is high. In daily life, self-agency and high coping potential 
often may co-occur: Goal-incongruent events caused by oneself typically may be easier to cope 
with (i.e., undo or repair) than goal-incongruent events caused by others or circumstances. For 
example, when you end a relationship with someone (self-agency), you have a higher chance of 
fixing it again (coping potential is high) than when the other person ends it (other-agency, coping 
potential is low). High coping potential has been shown to increase active problem-solving 
behaviors that could be seen as expressions of the tendency to repair (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & 
Magee, 2003; Mikulincer, 1988, 1994; Wortman & Brehm, 1975). In Study 1, the natural co-
occurrence between the appraisal of self-agency, the appraisal of coping potential, and the 
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tendency to repair may have been artificially pulled apart by carefully matching the self-agency 
and circumstances-agency trials for coping potential (see Table 1). In Study 2, we investigated 
the possibility that self-agency and the tendency to repair co-occur because both are related to 
coping potential, using the method of autobiographical recall. 
A second aim of Study 2 was to investigate three possible explanations for the 
inconsistencies between our results and those obtained in previous studies concerning the 
relation between regret and the tendency to repair. In these previous studies, participants recalled 
an event in which they felt regret or disappointment and indicated the extent to which they had 
the tendency to repair. The results of these studies showed that recalled regret was associated 
with a stronger tendency to repair than other negative feelings, such as disappointment (Roseman 
et al., 1994; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, et al., 1998). A first difference is that in previous 
studies the tendency to repair was often measured using items that implied self-agency. For 
instance, Roseman et al. (1994) used items such as “to what extent did you feel like correcting a 
mistake” (implying that the person made a mistake), “want to get a second chance” (implying 
that the person failed the first time), and “want to improve your performance” (implying  that the 
outcome was caused by the person’s previous performance). Given the close relation between 
regret and self-agency, the relation between regret and the tendency to repair may have been 
overestimated by measuring the tendency to repair via items that implied self-agency. 
Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, and van der Pligt  (1998) used several items of Roseman et al. 
(1994) that implied self-agency, with the exception of one item: “to what extent did you want to 
undo the event?” Recalled regret was associated with a stronger tendency to undo the event than 
recalled disappointment (gs = 0.40, a small to medium effect). This finding does suggest that a 
person feeling regret is more motivated to repair a goal-incongruent outcome than a person 
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feeling disappointment. In Study 2, we tried to replicate and extend the findings of Zeelenberg, 
van Dijk, Manstead, and van der Pligt  (1998). We measured the tendency to repair with two sets 
of items: one set that referred to the appraisal of self-agency (e.g., “to what extent did you want a 
second chance”) and another set that did not refer to the appraisal of self-agency (e.g. “to what 
extent did you have the tendency to undo the event”). Similar to Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, 
and van der Pligt  (1998), we compared the tendency to repair for participants who recalled an 
instance of regret and ones who recalled an instance of disappointment. We hypothesized that 
there would be a difference between regret and disappointment for items referring to self-agency 
and a significantly smaller difference for items not referring to self-agency (H4). A power 
analysis suggested that to obtain a significant effect for the items not referring to self-agency (α 
= .05, β = 0.80), we needed a sample of at least 200 participants (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead 
et al., 1998). 
A second difference is that previous studies compared instances of regret and 
disappointment across participants, whereas we used an individual differences approach 
(correlating feelings of regret/disappointment with the tendency to repair). In Study 2, we used 
both approaches: As described above, we used the same approach as Zeelenberg, van Dijk, 
Manstead, and van der Pligt  (1998). In addition, we used the individual differences approach of 
our own Study 1 and investigated whether the intensity of regret or the intensity of 
disappointment was a better predictor of the tendency to repair. To address this question, we 
asked all participants (both those who recalled an instance of regret and those who recalled an 
instance of disappointment) to indicate the intensity of regret and disappointment. Study 1 
suggested that the intensity of disappointment would be a significant predictor of the tendency to 
repair (H5) but not the intensity of regret (H6). 
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A third difference between our Study 1 and previous studies is that the latter investigated 
naturally occurring regret and disappointment, whereas we used a carefully controlled 
experimental setting. In real life, the circumstances giving rise to regret may be correlated with 
the circumstances giving rise to the tendency to repair, but these circumstances may not have 
been present in Study 1. For instance, as argued before, regret may follow from an appraisal of 
self-agency and the tendency to repair may follow from an appraisal of coping potential and both 
appraisals may often co-occur. The current Study 2 investigated naturally occurring regret and 
disappointment to keep this feature similar to other studies. To investigate the hypothesized sets 
of co-occurrences, we estimated the strengths of all possible direct and indirect relations between 
appraisals (self-agency and coping potential),  action tendencies (the tendency to repair), and 
feelings (regret and disappointment), using structural equation modeling (SEM). The 
investigated model is presented in Figure 4. We are aware that SEM does not allow us to test 
causal relations among the variables. Therefore all our hypotheses were framed in terms of 
“variable X is related to/ (statistically) predicts variable Y” and not in terms of causality. 
Because we were interested in predicting the values of some variables (i.e., the tendency to 
repair) and not others (i.e., the appraisal of self-agency and coping potential), the former were 
entered as outcomes and the latter as predictors. Feelings of regret and disappointment were 
sometimes entered as predictors and sometimes as outcomes. We tested the idea that self-agency 
is not directly related to the tendency to repair (H7), but that self-agency is related to coping 
potential (H8), and that coping potential is related to the tendency to repair (H9). In addition, we 
tested whether the appraisal of self-agency is positively related to feelings of regret (H10).  
Finally, we examined the remaining relations between appraisals and feelings. We 
investigated if we could replicate the relation between self-agency and disappointment obtained 
24 
 
in Study 1 (H11) and explored the relations between coping potential and regret (H12) and 
between coping potential and disappointment (H13). 
Method 
Participants. 
A total of 659 psychology students at Ghent University were contacted via email to fill in 
an online questionnaire study on regret or disappointment in return for participation in a prize 
lottery. After a first call for responses and a reminder after two and five weeks, 114 responses 
were obtained for the regret questionnaire (response rate 34.55%) and 116 for the disappointment 
questionnaire (response rate 35.26%). Four non-native Dutch speaking participants were 
excluded because their level of Dutch (as apparent from their written answers to four open 
questions) was judged as insufficient by two independent raters. In total 114 regret respondents 
(21 men) and 112 disappointment respondents (22 men) remained in the study (Mage = 18.95, SD 
= 3.67). All answers were collected and stored anonymously. 
Procedure.  
Participants were asked to fill in a 15 minute online questionnaire (administered via 
Limesurvey) about regret or disappointment as part of a large-scale research project on emotions. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the regret or disappointment questionnaire. On the first 
page of the questionnaire, participants were informed about the general aim of the study and 
about data confidentiality. The questionnaire contained more items than needed for the present 
study. We briefly mention the content of the irrelevant items to sketch the measurement context 
of the items under study. 
The questionnaire started with a number of demographic questions (sex, age, nationality, 
and native language). Subsequently, participants were asked to take a few minutes to recall an 
25 
 
event in their life in which they felt regret (in the regret condition) or disappointment (in the 
disappointment condition). The instructions encouraged participants to recall an event that was 
specific in time and space. Participants wrote down a short description of the recalled event and 
indicated the approximate date of the event on a calendar. They also rated the intensity of regret 
(in the regret condition) or disappointment (in the disappointment condition) at the time of the 
event as well as at the time of recall on two scales ranging from 1 (completely not intense) to 9 
(very intense). 
Subsequently, several appraisals, ruminative thoughts (e.g., counterfactual thoughts), 
action tendencies, and behaviors were measured. Items were rated on scales ranging from 1 (not 
at all) to 9 (yes completely), unless stated otherwise. In respective order, the following appraisals 
were measured: novelty, expectancy, goal congruence for yourself and for others, valence for 
yourself and for others, prevention focus, promotion focus, agency, coping potential, future 
expectancy, intrinsic controllability, norm violation, and uncertainty. The appraisal of self-
agency was measured via two items (α = .65). One item asked participants to briefly describe the 
cause of the event and to indicate the extent to which the event was a consequence of their own 
behavior or choices
6
. The other item asked participants to rate the extent to which they had 
control over the occurrence of the event. The appraisal of coping potential was measured via four 
items (α = .77): Participants rated whether (a) they were able to change the event after its 
occurrence, (b) they were able to undo the event, (c) they were able to improve the situation, and 
(d) their behavior determined whether the event could still change. 
Action tendencies were measured by asking participants about particular thoughts about 
actions, wishes about action outcomes, and action tendencies that accompanied the feeling of 
regret and disappointment. Items of the latter type were preceded by a short introductory 
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paragraph: “The feeling of regret (disappointment) is sometimes accompanied by the tendency to 
perform a particular behavior. Indicate to which extent you had the tendency to behave in a 
particular way” (the word “tendency” was underlined). In total, three types of action tendencies 
were measured: The tendency to repair (6 items), the tendency to avoid (11 items), and the 
tendency to be passive (4 items). The tendencies to avoid and to be passive were not analyzed in 
the current study. The tendency to repair was measured with two sets of items, some of which 
were adopted from previous studies (Roseman et al., 1994; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead et 
al., 1998). Items in the first set did not involve a confound of the tendency to repair with self-
agency (α = .74), asking to which extent participants had the tendency to (a) change the situation, 
(b) improve or rectify the situation, and (c) undo the event. Items in the second set of items did 
involve a confound of the tendency to repair with self-agency (α = .62), asking to which extent 
participants (a) thought about how they would handle the situation differently next time, (b) 
wished they could turn back time, and (c) wanted a second chance. The latter items are 
confounded with self-agency because only if the participant’s behavior influenced the occurrence 
of the situation, it makes sense to think about handling the situation differently next time, turning 
back time, and wanting a second chance. For instance, if one believes that the event was caused 
by circumstances or others, turning back time is pointless because the same event is very likely 
to occur again.  
After completing the items on action tendencies, participants rated their actual behavior 
in the situation: repairing (3 items), avoidance (4 items), passivity (3 items), apologizing (1 
item), and aggression (1 item). In the current study, we focused on action tendencies rather than 
actual behavior to avoid the criticism that it is obvious that people only perform repair behavior 
when it is physically possible (i.e., in situations with high coping potential). Finally, participants 
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rated the intensity of feelings of fear, sadness, anger, guilt, happiness, powerlessness, energy, 
restlessness, calmness, despair, frustration, shame, relief, and regret or disappointment
7
. In the 
disappointment condition, participants were additionally asked to indicate whether the episode 
that they had recalled could be categorized as disappointment over an outcome or in a person
8
. 
The model was fitted on the entire sample (collapsing recalled regret and disappointment) 
via structural equation modeling using the Lavaan 0.4-12 package in R (Rosseel, 2012). Three 
variables were treated as latent variables: the appraisal of self-agency (2 items), the appraisal of 
coping potential (4 items), and the tendency to repair (3 items, not confounded with self-agency). 
The intensities of regret and disappointment were each measured with a single item. The 
goodness-of-fit was evaluated via four fit indexes: Chi-square (Chi-square divided by the degrees 
of freedom should be < 2), the comparative fit index (CFI, should be > .95), the root-mean-
square error of approximation (RMSEA, should be < .06), and the standardized root-mean-
square residual (SRMR, should be < .09; Hu & Bentler, 1999). Standardized parameter estimates 
are reported. 
Results 
We first discuss the results for H4 and then turn to the model fitting to test H5 to H13. 
Hypothesis 4. 
Before testing Hypothesis 4, we ran an exploratory factor analysis (with varimax 
rotation) on the six repair items to investigate whether the confounded and non-confounded 
items loaded onto different factors. The factor analysis confirmed the hypothesized two-factor 
structure: A first factor with high loadings for the non-confounded items (.70 to .87) and low 
loadings for the confounded items (.06 to .26) and a second factor with high loadings for the 
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confounded items (.69 to .81) and low loadings for the non-confounded items (.05 to .23). This 
suggests that the confounded and non-confounded items reflected different constructs. 
Next, we tested whether the difference between recalled regret and disappointment with 
respect to the tendency to repair was stronger for items that confounded self-agency and the 
tendency to repair than for items that did not (H4). First, the confounded and non-confounded 
items were aggregated into two variables. Second, a mixed models ANOVA was run to test for 
an interaction between item type (confounded vs. non-confounded) and condition (recalled regret 
vs. recalled disappointment). This interaction was highly significant, F(1, 224) = 15.63, p < .001, 
η²p = .065. As expected, participants in the regret condition reported a stronger tendency to repair 
(M = 7.35, SD = 1.72) than participants in the disappointment condition (M = 6.26, SD = 2.04), 
t(224) = 4.34, p < .001, on items that were confounded with self-agency. However, on items that 
were not confounded with self-agency, participants in the regret condition reported an equally 
strong tendency to repair (M = 5.94, SD = 2.15) than participants in the disappointment condition 
(M = 6.03, SD = 2.20), t(224) = -0.31, p = .76. Independent samples t-tests showed that all 
confounded items presented the expected difference. Recalled regret was accompanied by more 
thoughts on handling the situation differently next time (difference = 0.89, CI.95 = 0.20, 1.58; 
t(224) = 2.54, p = .012), with wanting to turn back time (difference = 1.68, CI.95 = 1.04, 2.32; 
t(224) = 5.15, p < .001), and with wanting a second chance (difference = 0.70, CI.95 = 0.04, 1.36;  
t(224) = 2.08, p = .039) than recalled disappointment (see Table 3). There were no differences 
for any of the non-confounded items, i.e., the tendency to change the situation (difference = -
0.47, CI.95 = -1.15, 0.22; t(224) = 1.35, p = .18), the tendency to improve or rectify the situation 
(difference = -0.06, CI.95 = -0.76, 0.64; t(224) < 1), and the tendency to undo the event 
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(difference = 0.26, CI.95 = -0.46, 0.98; t(224) < 1, see Table 3). For the SEM we used the non-
confounded items only. 
Hypotheses 5 to 13. 
Before fitting the model, multivariate normality for the data was inspected by plotting the 
quantiles of the Mahalanobis transformed data against the quantiles of a chi-square distribution 
with 11 degrees of freedom. The data points showed a systematic deviation from the expected 
distribution. We therefore applied the Satorra-Bentler correction (Hu, Bentler, & Kano, 1992; 
Satorra & Bentler, 1994; scaling factor 1.028). 
We first investigated whether the model (Figure 4) reproduced the data sufficiently well 
(i.e., whether the absolute fit of the model was acceptable). Fit indexes indicated a good model 
fit, χ²(37) = 61.50, p = .007; CFI = .956, RMSEA = .054; SRMR = .047. Subsequently, we 
inspected the estimates for each of the discussed relations.  
First, we examined the hypotheses pertaining to the relations between the feelings 
(disappointment and regret) and the tendency to repair (H5 and H6). Replicating the results of 
Study 1, the intensity of disappointment was a significant predictor of the tendency to repair 
(confirming H5), z = 3.37, p = .001, and the intensity of regret was not (confirming H6), z = 1.38, 
p = .17. To investigate whether disappointment predicted the tendency to repair significantly 
better than regret, we investigated the fit of a constrained model that had the same structure as 
the model in Figure 4, but with the additional constraint that the parameter of the relation 
between regret and the tendency to repair had to be equal to the parameter of the relation 
between disappointment and the tendency to repair. If the fit of the constrained model is 
statistically lower than that of the unconstrained model (in which these parameters are estimated 
separately and thus are allowed to differ), one can conclude that the relations are statistically 
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different. There was a trend toward a better fit for the unconstrained model, χD(1) = 3.29, p = 
.0696 (scaled difference test; Satorra, 2000; Satorra & Bentler, 2010), suggesting that 
disappointment was a better predictor of the tendency to repair than regret.  
Second, we examined the hypotheses pertaining to the relations between the appraisals 
(self-agency and coping potential) and the tendency to repair (H7 and H9) and the relation 
among these appraisals (H8). As predicted, we found no direct relation between the appraisal of 
self-agency and the tendency to repair (confirming H7), z = -0.36, p = .72, but we did find a 
direct positive relation between coping potential and the tendency to repair (confirming H9), z = 
2.78, p = .005. The relation between the appraisals of self-agency and coping potential was 
positive and significant (confirming H8), z = 4.77, p < .001. The strength of the indirect relation 
between self-agency and the tendency to repair was .16 (equaling the product of the two direct 
relations, i.e., .49 and .33). When fitting the same model without the arrow between coping 
potential and the tendency to repair, a significant relation between self-agency and the tendency 
to repair did emerge (β = 0.19, z = 2.00, p = .046). This confirms that the relation between self-
agency and the tendency to repair can be explained by a relation between self-agency and coping 
potential and a relation between coping potential and the tendency to repair. 
Third, we examined the hypotheses pertaining to the relation between appraisals (self-
agency and coping potential) and feelings (regret and disappointment; H10 to H13). The 
appraisal of self-agency was directly related to regret (confirming H10 and replicating the result 
of Study 1), z = 3.39, p = .001, but unrelated to disappointment (disconfirming H11 and not 
replicating the result of  Study 1), z = -1.07, p = .28. The appraisal of coping potential was not 
related to regret (H12), z = -.619, p = .54, nor to disappointment (H13), z = 1.35 p = .18. 
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Finally, we investigated whether the relation between regret and the tendency to repair 
was significant when fitting the same model without the direct relations between the appraisals 
(self-agency and coping potential) and the tendency to repair. In this model disappointment again 
was a strong predictor of the tendency to repair (β = .27, z = 3.63, p < .001), and the relation 
between regret and the tendency to repair was marginally significant (β = .14, z = 1.89, p = .059). 
This suggests that the relation between the feeling of regret and the tendency to repair can be 
explained by the relation between regret and the appraisal of self-agency, the relation between 
self-agency and coping potential, and the relation between coping potential and the tendency to 
repair. 
Discussion 
Study 2 further examined the relations between the appraisal of self-agency, the tendency 
to repair, and regret. It supported the idea that the appraisal of self-agency and the tendency to 
repair co-occur because both are related to the appraisal of coping potential (H7 to H9). In 
addition, Study 2 provided novel insights on the relation between regret and the tendency to 
repair. In Study 1, we did not replicate the relation between regret and the tendency to repair 
found in previous studies (Roseman et al., 1994; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, et al., 1998). 
We investigated whether the results of our study diverged from the literature because of (a) 
different ways of  measuring the tendency to repair (confounded vs. not confounded with self-
agency), (b) different designs (individual differences approach vs. comparison across 
individuals), and (c) different settings (laboratory vs. real life). First, contrary to the findings of 
Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, et al. (1998), we found that regret and disappointment differed 
only with regard to the tendency to repair on items that confounded the tendency to repair with 
self-agency. In their study, the difference between regret and disappointment on non-confounded 
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items yielded an effect size of 0.40, whereas we observed a (maximum) effect size of 0.10. On 
the other hand, the difference between regret and disappointment for confounded items yielded 
an effect size of 0.26 to 0.60. The predominant use of confounded items may thus have 
contributed to the overestimation of the relation between regret and the tendency to repair. 
Second, using an individual differences approach similar to Study 1, we replicated the 
result that disappointment was more strongly related to the tendency to repair than regret 
(confirming H5 and H6). Thus, although comparing regret and disappointment across individuals 
does not yield significant differences with regard to the tendency to repair (on the non-
confounded items), individual differences in the tendency to repair were more strongly related to 
individual difference in disappointment than to individual differences in regret. 
Third, we found support for the idea that the conditions for regret (i.e., the appraisal of 
self-agency) naturally co-occur with the conditions for the tendency to repair (i.e., the appraisal 
of coping potential). This may explain why studies sampling from real-life experiences show a 
different pattern than lab studies in which appraisal variables are manipulated in isolation. The 
spurious relation between regret and the tendency to repair via self-agency and coping potential 
explains how regret may naturally co-occur with the tendency to repair without being a good 
predictor of the tendency to repair. 
General Discussion 
Our aim was to investigate the relation between the appraisal of self-agency and the 
tendency to repair. In addition, we investigated how each was related to regret and to other 
negative feelings. In Study 1, we experimentally manipulated agency (self vs. circumstances) 
and measured the tendency to repair as well as feelings of regret, disappointment, and anger. In 
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Study 2, participants recalled an event in which they felt regret or disappointment and rated their 
appraisals and action tendencies. 
In the introduction we suggested that the appraisal of self-agency and the tendency to 
repair could be (a) causally related, (b) temporally related without a causal relation, or (c) 
semantically related without actually co-occurring. Neither of our studies provided support for a 
causal relation. In Study 1, a careful experimental manipulation of agency (self vs. 
circumstances) did not lead to a difference in the tendency to repair (failing to confirm H1). In 
Study 2, there was no direct relation between the appraisal of self-agency and the tendency to 
repair. Study 2 did provide support for a temporal or semantic relation between the appraisal of 
self-agency and the tendency to repair, via the appraisal of coping potential: Self-caused events 
tended to go together with more coping potential (confirming H8) and coping potential was 
positively related to the tendency to repair (confirming H9). Because Study 2 relied on self-
reports, we cannot determine whether these relations reflect a real-world temporal co-occurrence 
or a semantic relation that only exists in people’s mind. 
Our studies also examined the relation between the appraisal of self-agency and the 
feeling of regret as well as other negative feelings. Previous studies suggested that regret can be 
differentiated from anger, disappointment, and fear, because it reflects the appraisal of self-
agency. Our studies confirmed that regret is related to the appraisal of self-agency. In Study 1, 
participants indicated they felt more regret in situations caused by themselves than in situations 
caused by circumstances (confirming H2a) and in Study 2, there was a positive relation between 
the appraisal of self-agency and regret (confirming H10). We also found evidence for a relation 
between self-agency and disappointment, but only in Study 1. One possible explanation for this 
pattern of findings is that self-agency relates to disappointment in certain contexts (e.g., 
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achievement in general or game performance specifically), but not in others (e.g., human 
relations). The relation between self-agency and regret may be more context free. Another 
possibility is that this difference is due to other procedural differences between Study 1 and 2. 
For instance, the time lag between emotional experience and measurement was very short in 
Study 1 (a couple of minutes at most), but long in Study 2 (the median lag between event and 
recall was 360 days). Other procedural differences that may have played a role are study design 
(experimental in Study 1 vs. correlational in Study 2) and ecological validity (low in Study 1 vs. 
high in Study 2). 
Finally, we investigated the relation between the tendency to repair and feelings of regret 
and disappointment. Neither of our studies provided support for the idea that the tendency to 
repair more often co-occurs with feelings of regret than with other negative feelings (H3a, H3b, 
H4, H5, and H6). It is important to note that the current data pattern does not imply that feelings 
of regret rarely co-occur with the tendency to repair, nor that the tendency to repair uniquely 
relates to disappointment (instead of uniquely to regret). In Study 2 (H4), participants who 
recalled an instance of regret and those who recalled an instance of disappointment reported an 
equally strong tendency to repair. In both Study 1 and 2, however, the intensity of 
disappointment was a better predictor of the tendency to repair than the intensity of regret. We 
could explain the latter finding by comparing the appraisal patterns that give rise to (a) the 
tendency to repair and (b) feelings labeled as regret and disappointment. With regard to “(a)”, we 
propose that all events appraised as goal incongruent lead to the tendency to repair. In addition, 
we observed in our studies that this tendency is increased when coping potential is appraised as 
high (H9), but not when the situation is appraised as caused by oneself (H1, H7). Thus, we 
propose that the tendency to repair is elicited by an appraisal pattern of goal incongruence plus 
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high coping potential. With regard to “(b)”, it is reasonable to assume that feelings of regret and 
disappointment both arise in situations appraised as goal incongruent. Our studies suggest that 
regret also is related to the appraisal of self-agency (H2a, H10) but not to the appraisal of coping 
potential (H12), whereas disappointment is not systematically related to either of these appraisals 
(H2b, H11, H13). The latter fits nicely with the idea that the word disappointment is used in a 
broader range of goal-incongruent situations than the word regret (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, 
Manstead et al., 1998). Taking “(a)” and “(b)” together, we suggest that the feeling of 
disappointment (related to an appraisal of goal incongruence) is a better predictor of the tendency 
to repair (related to an appraisal pattern of goal incongruence plus high coping potential) than the 
feeling of regret (related to an appraisal pattern of goal incongruence plus self-agency) because 
regret is related to an appraisal variable that is irrelevant to the tendency to repair (self-agency) 
and any variation in the feeling of regret due to this variable will not be predictive of the 
tendency to repair. Future studies may examine whether feelings of guilt (related to an appraisal 
pattern of goal incongruence for others plus self-agency; Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2008), can 
be used to predict the tendency to repair. 
Our data were not supportive of the idea that each specific feeling, such as regret and 
disappointment, reflects one unique action tendency, as the feeling-is-for-doing account 
(Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006) seems to suggest. The finding that both regret and disappointment 
relate to the same action tendency (to repair) seems more compatible with theories that argue 
against the existence of one-to-one relations between feelings and action tendencies, such as 
contemporary appraisal theories (see Moors, in press) and psychological constructivist views 
(e.g., Russell, 2009). Our studies did reveal recurrent patterns of relations between appraisals and 
feelings (e.g., self-agency and regret) and between action tendencies and feelings (e.g. the 
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tendency to repair and disappointment). Thus, the present data pattern suggests that regularities 
do exist, but that one should be careful with assuming strict one-to-one relations between some 
of the components of emotions.  
Our studies do not argue against the view described in the introduction that regret is 
related to particular counterfactual thoughts, mental time travel, and vivid simulations of 
alternative actions. The appraisal of self-agency may cause people to focus on their own 
behavior and think about how things could have been different if they had made other choices. 
Similarly, regret may relate to those cognitions that help a person avoid similar mistakes in the 
future (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Zeelenberg et al., 2000). The experience of 
regret may thus relate to qualitative behavioral changes in future choice situations (i.e., choosing 
those options that minimize regret). Support for this idea has been obtained in research showing 
that choice behavior heavily depends on anticipated regret (Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997; 
Zeelenberg, Beattie, vanderPligt, & deVries, 1996; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004b).  
Our studies have a number of limitations that could be addressed in future research. First, 
the data of Study 1 and 2 were collected in a sample of Dutch speaking psychology students. The 
limitations concerning this sample are twofold. First, emotional experiences that are labeled in 
Dutch as regret (“spijt”) and disappointment (“teleurstelling”) may not be the same as those in 
English and other languages. A replication across other language groups therefore seems crucial. 
On the other hand, several of the original studies on regret and disappointment also used a Dutch 
sample (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead et al., 1998), which 
makes our studies comparable to these studies at least. Second, although the program for first 
year psychology students at Ghent University does not contain any intensive courses on 
emotions, one could argue that psychology students more often think about their emotions than 
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other students or non-students. Therefore, any differences between emotions that are so similar 
as regret and disappointment may be inflated by the fact that our participants elaborate more on 
their emotions than the average person (Tugade, Fredrickson, & Barrett, 2004). 
A second potential limitation is that the manipulation of agency in Study 1 may have 
lacked the strength to evoke differences in the tendency to repair. One could argue that the 
participants in Study 1 simply guessed which fruit would yield ten points and did not actually 
feel like “agents” on the self-agency trials. In this respect it is important to note that (a) the 
manipulation check showed that our manipulation of agency was successful and did produce 
significant differences in feelings of regret, (b) Study 2 replicated the pattern of results of Study 
1, refuting the idea that this pattern of findings is limited to laboratory and/or guessing situations, 
and (c) the television quiz example of the introduction suggests that even when people make a 
guess, they still can see themselves as the cause of an outcome and experience regret when this 
outcome is negative. Future studies may investigate whether other experimental procedures (e.g., 
in which the occurrence of goal-congruent outcomes is governed by a set of rules that 
participants discover during the experiment) can yield stronger appraisals of self-agency and may 
generate different findings. 
A third limitation is that the structural equation modeling of Study 2 informs us about the 
existence of relations between variables, but not about the (causal) nature of these relations. In 
Study 1, we did find support for a causal relation between the appraisal of self-agency and the 
feeling of regret, but several questions remain about other relations examined in Study 2. For 
instance, it is unclear whether the appraisals of self-agency and coping potential merely co-occur 
or whether they may be causally related. Study 2 also did not provide information about the 
(causal) nature of the relation between the appraisal of coping potential and the tendency to 
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repair, but previous research has shown that the appraisal of coping potential increases behaviors 
that can be seen as manifestations of the tendency to repair (Galinsky et al., 2003; Mikulincer, 
1988, 1994; Wortman & Brehm, 1975). 
Our studies hint at new avenues for research on the relation between the appraisal of self-
agency and the tendency to repair. The studies cited in the introduction suggest that in a social 
context there might be a causal relation between the appraisal of self-agency and the tendency to 
repair. These studies show that people put more effort in repairing a goal-incongruent event for 
another person when they caused it themselves (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; de Hooge et al., 2011; 
Parkinson & Illingworth, 2009, but see Konecni, 1972). The relation between self-agency and 
the tendency to repair may thus be moderated by the extent to which an event is negative for 
oneself or for others. Other potential moderators are the likability of the other person, the 
presence of others, and the appraisal of intentionality (i.e., whether or not the agent had the 
intention of causing the outcome). Future studies could also address the influence of the cost of 
repairing. In Study 1 repairing was not very costly. It did not consume much energy or time. One 
could argue that in real life, repair behavior often does require a lot of energy, and that 
participants would respond differently if repairing would be more costly: They might, for 
instance, be more reluctant to repair a negative outcome caused by circumstances. 
To conclude, our studies suggest that an appraisal of self-agency increases feelings of 
regret but not the tendency to repair. They further suggest that feelings of disappointment are a 
better predictor of the tendency to repair than feelings of regret. Our studies go against the 
prevailing idea that a person who feels disappointment is less motivated to repair a negative 
outcome than a person who feels regret. 
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Footnotes 
1
There were no effects of incentive for participation (money vs. course credit) on any of 
the dependent measures: the number of repair responses on self- or circumstances-agency trials, 
ts < 0.15,  ps > .88, the self-reported tendency to repair on self- or circumstances-agency trials, ts 
< 0.95, ps > .35, and feelings of regret and disappointment on self- or circumstances-agency 
trials, ts < 1.7, ps > .11. 
2
In reality, there was no such algorithm. The program determined that 60% of the trials 
yielded an outcome of ten points. 
3
We only analyzed trials on which repairing was impossible because only on those trials 
participants always had to decide themselves when to stop repairing. On trials on which repairing 
was possible, participants typically regained the ten points after a number of button presses and 
the fix button subsequently disappeared. 
4
Using other outlier criteria, no outlier criteria, or medians instead of means produced the 
same results. The same results were also observed when we analyzed the number of trials in 
which participants engaged in repair behavior (Mself = 95.79, SDself = 10.15; Mself = 96.51, SDself = 
7.14; t(25) = 0.74, p = 0.46), instead of the number of repair responses. 
5
All two tailed p-values. 
6
Participants also indicated the extent to which the event was a consequence of the 
behavior or choices of one or more other persons (other-agency) and a consequence of situational 
factors or circumstances (circumstances-agency). These items were not analyzed in the current 
study. 
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7
At this time, participants in the regret/disappointment condition rated feelings of 
disappointment/regret only because they already rated feelings of regret/disappointment at the 
beginning of the questionnaire. 
8
Sixty-three participants were disappointed in an outcome and 49 in a person. There were 
no significant differences between these groups with respect to the tendency to repair (tendency 
to change the situation, t(110) < 1, p = .39, improve or rectify the situation, t(110) < 1, p = .96, 
and undo the event, t(110) = 1.24, p = .16. 
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Table 1 
Means (SDs), dependent sample t-tests, and effect sizes (gav) for the manipulation check, the 
measures of the tendency to repair, and feelings for self- and circumstances-agency trials. 
  Agency   
  Self Circumstances t(25) p-value gav 
Manipulation 
Check 
Self-agency (immediate outcome) 3.62 1.32 2.15 1.35 4.21 <.001 1.02 
Self-agency (eventual outcome) 4.04 1.71 2.92 1.60 3.92  < .001 0.67 
Expectancy (immediate outcome) 4.31 0.97 4.15 0. 83 1.16  .26 0.59 
Expectancy (eventual outcome) 5.08 1.32 4.58 1.10  2.05  .051 0.66 
Valence 3.27 1.15 3.69 1.19 1.39  .18 -0.36 
Fairness 4.27 1.19 4.23 1.21 0.13 .90 0.03 
Future expectancy  4.12 1.42 4.15 1.22 0.21 .83 -0.03 
Coping potential 3.46 1.84 3.65 1.77 0.64 .53 -0.11 
Tendency to 
repair 
Tendency to take sideway 5.92 1.52 6.08 1.35 1.07 .29 -0.11 
Tendency to keep repairing 4.35 1.74 4.23 1.58 0.62 .54 0.07 
Number of repair responses 39.66 14.24 39.71 13.50 0.03 .98 -0.003 
Feelings 
Regret 3.85 1.59 2.31 1.59 3.84  < .001 0.95 
Anger 2.12 1.37 1.92 1.44 0.64 .53 0.14 
Disappointment 4.12 1.66 2.96 1.48 2.81 .009 0.71 
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Table 2 
Correlations between feelings and the tendency to repair for self-agency trials (Self), 
circumstances-agency trials (Circ), the difference score between self- and circumstances-agency 
trials (Diff), and the aggregated scores across self- and circumstances-agency trials (Total).  
  Regret Disappointment Anger 
  Self Circ Diff Total Self Circ Diff Total Self Circ Diff Total 
Repair 
behavior 
Self .01x    .39y
(*) 
   .39x
* 
   
Circ  .16x    .39x
(*) 
   .29x   
Diff   .01x    .36x’
(*) 
   .01x  
Total    .12x    .45x’
* 
   .42x
* 
Self-
reported 
Repair 
Tendency 
Self .22x    .50x’
* 
   .14x    
Circ  .29x    .37x
(*) 
   .24x   
Diff   .09x    .48y
* 
   .26x  
Total    .32x    .50x
*
    .19x 
(*)
 p  < .10, 
*
 p <.05, 
**
 p < .01. Correlations for disappointment and anger received the subscript 
x if not different from the correlation for regret depicted on the same line (p > .10), the subscript 
x’ if marginally different from the correlation for regret depicted on the same line (p < .10), and 
the subscript y if significantly different from the correlation for regret depicted on the same line 
(p < .05), .
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Table 3 
Means (SDs), independent sample t-tests, and effect size (Hedges gs) for the tendency to repair 
items, split up into those that include reference to self-agency (Confounded) and those that do 
not (Non-confounded).  
Item type Item (short description) Disappointment Regret t p gs 
Confounded 
Handle the situation differently 5.91 (2.61) 6.80 (2.65) 2.54 .012 0.34 
Want to turn back time 6.26 (2.95) 7.94 (1.83) 5.15 <.001 0.68 
Want a second chance 6.61 (2.68) 7.31 (2.37) 2.08 .039 0.26 
Non-
confounded 
Change the situation 6.10 (2.67) 5.63 (2.53) -1.35 .18 0.18 
Improve or rectify the situation 5.96 (2.61) 5.90 (2.73) -0.17 .86 0.02 
Undo the event 6.03 (2.79) 6.29 (2.68) 0.72 .47 0.10 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1 Hypotheses of Study 1 (H1, H2a, H3a) about the inter-relations between the appraisal 
of self-agency, the tendency to repair, and the feeling of regret. 
Figure 2 Picture of the maze.  
Figure 3 Pictures of the trials. Panel A depicts the starting phase of a self-agency trial (the word 
ME appears in front of the avatar); panel B depicts the starting phase of a circumstances-agency 
trial (a die appears in front of the avatar). Panel C depicts the outcome phase of a goal-
incongruent trial. Panel D depicts the outcome phase of a goal-congruent trial. 
Figure 4 Hypotheses and results of the Structural Equation Model of the relations between the 
appraisal of self-agency, the appraisal of coping potential, the feeling of regret, the feeling of 
disappointment, and the tendency to repair. Full lines represent significant relations (* p < .05; 
** p < .01; *** p < .001); dashed lines represent non-significant relations (p >.05). 
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Figure 1. 
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Figure 2. 
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Figure 3. 
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Figure 4. 
 
